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1.  INTRODUCTION
The  stated objectives  of  the  Food and Agriculture Acts  of  1977  and  1981
are  "to  provide price and income  protection to  farmers,  assure  consumers  of
an  abundance of  food and fibre  at  reasonable  prices,  continue food
assistance  to low  income  households  and for other purposes."  (3,4)  In  the
case of  the major crops  - wheat,  feed  grains,  rice,  upland cotton and
soybeans  - the mechanisms  currently  used  to  achieve  these objectives  include
nonrecourse loans,  a deficiency payment  scheme  and acreage controls.
Nonrecourse loans  are  9 to  12  month loans which the  government makes
available to  farmers  at  a specified loan rate per unit  of  production.  The
farmer's  crop  is  used  as  collateral.  When the  loan reaches maturity, the
farmer may repay  it,  plus  interest,  in cash,  or  repay  it  in kind  using his
crop.  This program is  an example of  a "minimum price scheme"  in which  the
government  maintains  a floor price  to  both producers and consumers  by.
acquiring or disposing  of  stocks  of  grain.  It will  be  referred  to  by  this
term throughout  the paper.  Deficiency payments  are made  to wheat, grain and
upland cotton producers when the average market price  over  the  first  five
months  of  the marketing year  falls  below a specified  "target  price".  The
payment per unit  production  is  the difference between  the  target price  and
the maximum of  the market price and  the  rate at which nonrecourse  loans  are
made  available.  To qualify for  deficiency payments  producers may  be
required to  reduce  their planted acreage from an assessed base  level.  Land
*  I would like to thank Dr. G. Edward Schuh for reading  this  paper and
for making many helpful comments  and suggestions.-2-
diversion payments,  in cash or  in kind, may  be  received  by  farmers  for land
removed from production under  this program.  Further information on these
programs  can be found in  (1).
This paper presents  a partial equilibrium analysis  of  the separate and
combined effects  of  these  three  price support  programs  in the  context  of  a
grain exporting country.  It  builds upon Schuh's  examination of  deficiency
payments  and explicit  export  subsidies  in an  open economy  (2).  However, a
brief  review  of  these programs  in a closed economy setting  is  first pre-
sented  for comparison purposes.  This  review makes use of Wallace's  analysis
of  deficiency payments  and acreage controls  (5).  Major results  are:  (1) A
deficiency payment  scheme  in  the  domestic economy  is  less  likely  to  result  in
lower prices  to domestic  consumers when  part  of  domestic grain production is
exported than when it  is  all  sold on  the domestic market.  (2) In an open
economy,  deficiency payments  increase both  the volume of world  trade in  the
product  concerned and  the  domestic  economy's  share  of  that  volume, whereas  a
minimum price  scheme  results  in  a contraction of  world trade  and a reduction
in the  domestic economy's  share  of  the volume of  world trade.  (3) In  an open
economy,  the volume  of  stocks  accumulated in support  of  a minimum price  is
influenced not  only  by  changes  in  domestic supply and demand conditions  but
also  by  changes  in demand and supply in  the  rest  of  the world.  Nevertheless,
the  level of  stocks  is  likely  to  be  smaller  for  an open economy  than for a
closed economy,  ceteris paribus.  (4) It  is  well known that  programs such as
nonrecourse  loans and  acreage  reductions, which increase  the price  paid by
consumers,  also increase gross  revenue to  producers provided demand  is  ine-
lastic, a condition which is  likely to  apply to  agricultural products  in  a
closed economy.  However,  in  an open economy such programs  are  less  effec--3-
tive  at  providing income  support  and may even  reduce gross  revenue to  produ-
cers  if  foreign demand  is  elastic and increases  in  domestic expenditure  are
offset  by  reductions in export  revenue.
2.  CLOSED ECONOMY ANALYSIS
2.1  Deficiency Payments
In a closed economy a deficiency payment  scheme  could simultaneously
provide price and income protection  to  farmers  and assure consumers  of  an
abundance of  food  at  low  prices,  albeit with  some  loss  of  efficiency and
possibly at  considerable  expense  to  the  taxpayer.  Figure  1 shows how  the
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If PT < P  the deficiency payment scheme has  no effect on  the free market  allocation of resources.
market allocation of  resources.-4-
Producers supply  Qp and receive  the  (relatively high) price  PT  per
unit.  Total revenue  is OPTCQp,  made  up  of  OPcJQp from consumers who pay  the
(relatively  low)  price of PC  for  each of  Qp units,  and PCPTCJ  in deficiency
payments  from the government which are ultimately provided  by  the  taxpayer.
The total  resource costs  of  the scheme  are defined as  the value of  addi-
tional  resources  attracted into  the  sector and  they  equal QeECQp.  Total
benefits  are  defined as  consumers' willingness  to  pay  for  the  extra output
and they  equal QeEJQp.  The  overall efficiency  loss  is  CEJ.  However, both
consumers  and producers  benefit  from the program,  consumer surplus
increasing by  PCPeEJ  and producer surplus increasing  by  PePTCE.  The losers
are  taxpayers whose  purchasing power is  reduced  by PCPTCJ.
2.2  Minimum Price Schemes
A mimimum price scheme guarantees  producers a specified price for  their
output.  Under a system of  nonrecourse  loans  producers'  miminum price  is  the
loan rate, PL,  in Figure  2.
Consumers pay  and producers  receive a higher price, PL,  than  the free
market  price.  However,  consumers  acquire a smaller quantity, QC, while
farmers produce a larger quantity, Qp,  than  the  free  market quantity.  The
difference, QP-QC' is  accumulated as  government  owned stocks.  Total revenue
to producers  is OPLKQp.
Ignoring any potential value of  the  stocks,  the  net welfare  loss  of  the
scheme is QCGEKQp  since resources  equal to QeEKQp are  induced  into the  sec-
2These definitions of  total  resource  costs and  total benefits apply
throughout  this paper.
If  PL  < Pe then the  minimum price scheme does  not  alter the  free market
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tor  and consumers' total  benefits  fall by QCGEQe. However, unlike  the  defi-
ciency payment  scheme which benefits  both consumers  and producers, a minimum
price scheme  benefits  only producers.  Consumer  surplus  falls  by P PLGE,
producer surplus  increases  by PePLKE while government  expenditure on  stocks,
ultimately financed by  taxpayers,  equals QCGKQp.  The net  efficiency loss of
QCGEKQp is  larger  than  the efficiency  loss  of KEL associated with a com-
parable deficiency  payment scheme, namely one which sets  the  target  price
equal to PL in Figure 2.  The  above analysis assumes  that stocks  have zero
economic value  to  society.  However, their maximum potential value is QCGLQp
to  the  closed domestic economy, for  this  is  the  maximum amount  consumers
would be willing to  pay for them.  The government  can,  of  course,  dispose of
these stocks by giving  them away as  income  transfers  to groups  in the
domestic economy,  or can dispose of  them abroad, either  for a price  or as-6-
part  of  a foreign assistance program.  These alternative uses  of  the stocks
are  ignored in this  paper.
2.3  Deficiency Payments  and Minimum Price Schemes
A system which combines a minimum price  of  PL and deficiency  payments
with a target  price of  PT  > PL is portrayed in  Figure 3.
Figure 3
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Producers receive  price PT,  supply  quantity Qp  and receive  total  reve-
nue of  OPTCQp.  Consumers pay PL and  purchase quantity QC,  QP-QC being accu-
mulated as  government  stocks.  Note  that  the quantity Qp-Qp, which
represents  the extra production over and above  the  level called forth by  the
minimum price, PL,  is  simply absorbed into  government stocks along with the
quantity Qp-QC'
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If  PT < PL  the  deficiency payment scheme has  no effect on the  minimum
price scheme.-7-
Compared with the  free market  equilibrium, total utility  falls  by
QCGEQe and total  resource costs  increase  by QeECQp giving a net  welfare loss
of QCGECQp.  The latter  is  larger than the  deadweight  loss,  CEJ,  of  a defi-
ciency payment  scheme alone, but  smaller than  the  efficiency loss, QpAECQp,
of  a minimum price scheme with PL,  set  equal  to  PT.
At  first glance,  the  combination of  policies  might  be  viewed as  a
compromise.  It  can ensure that  producers receive a given target price, PT,
and a given target gross  income, OPTCQp, with deficiency payments, PLPTCM,
which are  smaller  than those  of  a deficiency payment scheme alone  (i.e.
PCPTCJ).  Although food prices  are higher  than under a deficiency  payment
scheme,  they are  lower,  and the  accumulation of  stocks  is  smaller,  than
under a minimum price  scheme with PL  = PT.  (The latter would accumulate
Qp-Qp in stocks and would charge  consumers PT.)  However, the  full Treasury
costs  of  the program include  the costs  of  acquiring stocks, QCGMQp,  as  well
as  deficiency  payments,  and their combined total may well exceed the
Treasury costs of  a deficiency payment scheme  alone.
2.4  Deficiency Payments, Minimum Price Schemes and Acreage Controls
The political conspicuousness  of  deficiency payments and stocks  may
lead  to the  adoption of  a three  policy package which combines  deficiency
payments  and a minimum price scheme with acreage  controls  (see Figure 4).
Acreage controls  result  in  the  least  costly  method of  production not
being used.  They  are  represented  by  a shift  to  the  left  of  the  supply func-
tion  (for example, to S' or S" in Figure  4).  In  the  extreme case where
supply  decreases from S to S",  the market  clearing price  is PT'  the quantity
produced and consumed is  Qp,  no stocks are accumulated and no deficiency
payments are made.  Compared with the  free market  equilibrium the  net  effi-
ciency loss  is  KAE.-8-
Figure 4
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A more moderate acreage reduction program which moves  supply  from S to
S' would result in the following:
(a)  Producers supply Qp  and  receive  a price of  PT.
(b)  Consumers acquire  QC at  a price of  PL.
(c)  QPQC are  added  to  government stocks.
(d)  Deficiency payments  are equal  to PLPTBF.
(e)  Treasury  costs  are PLPTBF (for deficiency payments) plus QCGFQp  (for
acquisition of  additional stocks).  These costs  decrease as  the amount
of land withdrawn from production increases.
(f)  The net welfare  loss  is  QCGEQe  (reduction in  total utility),  plus
Q EHQp  (increase in resource  costs  from the  free  market level using
the least  costly method  of production under  no acreage controls),
plus KBH (extra production costs  as  a result of  not  using  the most-9-
efficient method of  production under acreage controls).  The overall
net welfare loss  is  not a monotonic function of  the quantity of
land withdrawn from production so  no  a priori  conclusions  can be  drawn
about the  efficiency  of  this  program compared with a combination of
deficiency payments  and a minimum price scheme  without  acreage
controls.  Given specific demand and supply functions  there will  be
some optimal  amount  of  land  to withdraw so  as  to  minimize  the  net
welfare  loss  of  the  program.
(g)  Gross  income  received by farmers  from the  sale  of  their output  to  con-
sumers  or  to  government,  plus  deficiency payments,  decreases  as  the
amount of  land  set  aside  increases.  However, if  farmers  receive  land
diversion payments,  their gross  income may  increase or  decrease with
acreage reduction.  Whether  total revenue increases or decreases,  com-
pared with  the  free market  equilibrium, depends upon (i) the  elasticity
of demand,  (ii)  the amount  of  land withdrawn from production and  (iii)
payments per acre  of  land retired.  However, even  if  enough land is
retired  to completely  eliminate deficiency payments,  and if  no payments
are made  for land set  aside,  total  revenue will increase if  demand  is
inelastic.  Those economists  who have  in mind  a closed  economy model
when discussing agricultural policy,  generally accept  that demand for
agricultural goods  is  inelastic.  This  belief  is  fundamental to  the
advocacy of  policies which attempt  to  increase farm incomes  by
increasing farm prices  (and restricting supply).-10-
\
3.  OPEN  ECONOMY ANALYSIS
The policies  discussed in section 2 will now be  reexamined  in the  con-
text of  an open economy.  Consider a three  country world in which the United
States and country B are  net  exporters of  grain and  country A is  a net
importer.  For example, country A represents  countries  like Japan and  the
E.E.C.,  while country B represents  countries  like Canada and Australia.  The
currencies of  the  three countries will be  called dollars  (U.S.), alphas
(country A) and betas  (country B) and  the initial exchange  rate  is  assumed
to  be  $1 - al  =  81.  It  is  assumed  that there  are no barriers  to  trade and
no  transportation costs.
The free trade equilibrium is  depicted in  Figure 5.  The U.S.  have
excess supply ESus,  country A has  excess  demand EDA and country B has  excess
supply ESB.  The excess  demand  function facing U.S.  exporters is
EDW =  EDA - ESB.  The world price, PW (expressed in dollars),  clears  the
world market,  country A importing T from the U.S.  and X from country B.  The
world  price is  also  the U.S.  domestic price.  U.S. production is  Qp,  con-
sumption is QC and the difference T = Qp - QC is  exported.  Total revenue
received by U.S.  producers is  OPWBQp, OPWAQc  of which is  from domestic sales
and QCABQp of which is  export revenue.
The last  few  years have seen a steady appreciation in the  value  of  the
U.S.  dollar, the  effect of which has  been  to make U.S.  exports  less  com-
petitive in world markets.  An appreciation of  the U.S.  dollar against the
alpha and the  beta reduces  excess  demand from country A, increases  excess
supply from country B, and  thereby reduces world excess  demand facing U.S.
exporters  from EDW  to EDW in Figure 5.  The world price  falls from PW to
PW' imports  by  country A fall from M to M' (the price  in alphas  rises from-11-
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P  to  Pa)  and exports  by  country B rise  from X to X' (the price  in betas
rises  from P8 to Pg).  Consequently, U.S.  exports  fall, both  in absolute
terms  from T to  T',  and as  a percentage  of world trade.  Within the United
States  the  lower domestic price increases  consumption from Q  to QC' reduces
production from Qp to Qp and reduces  gross revenue of  grain producers  from
I  I
OPWBQp to OPwDQp.
3.1  Deficiency Payments
A deficiency payments scheme with target  price PT > PW, in an open eco-
nomy  is  depicted in Figure 6 and  its  effects are  listed in Table  1.  U.S.
production equals  Qp for all world prices not exceeding PT  so  the  U.S.'s
excess supply  function kinks  rightward for prices less  than PT.  The world
price falls  from PW  to PW in  response to  this  increase  in excess  supply and
world trade expands  because the price  in  country A falls from P  to Pa
However, exports  from country B fall  (since the price in  betas falls  from P
to Pg)  while  those  from the U.S.  expand both  in  absolute  terms from T  to T'
and as  a percentage  of world trade.  If  the  excess  demand function facing
U.S.  exporters is  elastic, export  revenue earned  by U.S.  producers increases
as a result of  the deficiency payments  scheme.  Assuming domestic demand is
inelastic, revenue  from domestic sales will  fall and total revenue from both
sources  could either  increase or decrease.
Comparing Figures 1 and 6, we  see  that a deficiency payment  scheme  in
an open economy is  less  beneficial to  domestic consumers  than it  is  in a
closed economy.  This  is  because  the  domestic price  in  an open economy
OX' > OX  and OM' < OM imply OX' > OX.  Hence, OT'  - 1 - OX' < 1 - OX - OT.
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equals the world price so domestic  consumers benefit  only  to  the extent  that
the  extra exports  resulting from  the program manage to  depress  the world
price.  The more elastic is  excess  demand from the  rest  of  the world,  (that
is,  the smaller the  country),  the  less  the world price will fall and the
smaller will  be  the  increase in  consumer surplus.  However, the  deficiency
payments necessary  to  support a given target price are  smaller in an open
economy  than  in a closed economy so  the  burden on  taxpayers  is  smaller.
3.2  Minimum Price Schemes
A minimum price scheme (based on nonrecourse loans)  in  the United
States makes  the domestic demand  curve,  and  the excess  supply  curve  from the
U.S.  to  the  rest of  the world, perfectly elastic at  the  loan rate.  In
Figure 7 the  loan rate, PL' is  above the  free market world price,  PW  ,6and
the effects  of  the program are catalogued in Table 2.
Notice  that  the world price  rises  from PW to Pw=PL,  the  loan  rate
becoming  in effect  a price floor in both  the U.S. domestic market and in  the
world market.  This  benefits  both U.S.  and foreign producers who experience
increases in their  producer surpluses  as  a result  of  price increases in
their local currencies.  However, domestic and  foreign consumers  experience
reductions in  their consumer surpluses due  to  these same price  increases.
In  contrast  to a deficiency payment scheme,  the  volume of  world trade
contracts from M to M',  but country B's  exports actually expand from X to X'
while those  from the U.S.  decrease  from T to T'.  Export  revenue earned by
domestic producers will fall if  excess  demand  from the  rest  of  the world is
If  PL  PW the  original free  market allocation is  unaffected.-15-
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elastic but,  if  domestic demand is  inelastic,  revenue from local sales will
increase.  Hence,  the direction of  change  in total revenue from both sources
cannot be predicted a priori.
The U.S.  government's  stocks of  grain must  increase by Qp-Qc-T'=KQp in
order to maintain the minimum price,  PL.  At price PL domestic production is
i  I
Qp, domestic consumption is  QC  and net consumption in  the  rest of  the world
is  T',  so  the balance must  be  acquired by  the government.  This  increase in
stocks is  smaller than  it would be  in  a closed  economy with  the same minimum
!  i
price, PL,  (namely Qp - QC ). However, in  an open economy the  change  in
stocks in  any given  period is  affected by changing demand and supply con-
ditions,  not only  at  home as  would occur  in a closed economy, but  also  in
the rest  of  the world.  For example, an  increase in  supply in country B
shifts ESB  to  the right  and EDW to  the left  and  thereby results  in more  than
KQp  being acquired as  stocks by  the U.S.  government.  Similarly,  a reduc-
tion in demand in country A, ceteris  paribus,  leads  the U.S. government  to
acquire stocks in excess of  KQp.  Indeed the  very existence of  a price sup-
port program in the U.S. may have a depressing effect on excess  demand by
the rest  of  the world if  other countries, knowing  that  the U.S.  government
is willing  to  carry stocks, demand fewer  stocks  themselves.  Nevertheless,
Figure 7 shows  that  the maximum change in U.S.  stocks  in any given period  is
I  I
QP - QC' which is  the stock  change in a closed economy with the  same loan
rate.  Hence a minimum price program such as  nonrecourse loans will, ceteris
paribus,  result in smaller accumulations of  stocks  in an open economy  than
in a closed economy.  This  result  occurs  because some  of  the stocks which
would be  accumulated at price PL  in a closed economy, will,  in an open eco-
nomy, be  sold  to  foreign consumers.-17-
In  an open economy,  as  in a closed economy, a minimum price scheme
benefits  producers  at  the  expense of  consumers  and taxpayers.  The  fall  in
consumer  surplus, PWPLEA,  is  more than offset  by  the  rise in producer
surplus, PWPLFB,  but  government  expenditure on stocks  is KJFQp  and this
represents  a loss  to  the  taxpayer.  The  net welfare  loss  is  KLBFQp-AEJL.
Unlike  the  closed economy analysis,  no a priori conclusions  can  be  drawn
about  the  relative net welfare losses  of  a deficiency payment scheme and a
minimum price scheme  in an open economy setting.
3.3  Deficiency Payments  and Minimum Price Schemes
A combination  of  deficiency payments  and a minimum price scheme  is
depicted in Figure 8, with the  target  price  set higher  than the  price  floor,
which in turn  is higher  than the  free market  world price.  The  effects of
the program are given in Table 3.  Both  the domestic  demand function and  the
U.S.'s excess  supply  function become  perfectly elastic  at  the minimum price,
PL, and the excess  supply function is  kinked  to  the  right  for world prices
between P  and PT.
The pattern of world  trade is  identical  to  that under a minimum price
scheme at  the same  price  floor, PL,  as  is  the level  of  consumption in the
United States.  The extra production, DH, called  forth by  the deficiency
payments, over  and above  the  production level  under the  minimum price
scheme,  is  simply  added to  government stocks,  along with quantity JD.
If  P  < P  and PL > P  the  deficiency payment scheme has  no effect  on
the allocation  of  resources under  the  minimum price scheme.  If  PL < PW and
PW  > PT  a minimum price and deficiency payments have no effect  on the  free
market allocation  of  resources.  If  PL < PW  and PW < PT'  a minimum price has
no effect  on the allocation  of  resources under a deficiency payment  scheme.-18-
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The system can support a given target  price, PT,  and a given target  gross
income, OPTFQp, with smaller deficiency payments  than a deficiency  payment
scheme  alone.  However, when  the  cost of  accumulated stocks  is  taken into
account,  the  burden on  taxpayers  (PLPTFH + KJHQp)  may exceed that  of  a defi-
ciency payment  scheme  by  itself.  The system can  also provide consumers  with
cheaper food and will accumulate fewer  stocks  than a comparable minimum price
scheme  (i.e.  one which sets  the  price floor  at PT) for  the  latter would  raise
the price  to  consumers  to  PT and would accumulate stocks  of  Qp  - QC.
3.4  DeficieRcy  Payments, Minimum Price Schemes and Acreage Controls
Currently in the United States,  the  target  price and the  loan rate  are
set  by  the  political process,  and  production required  to  satisfy domestic
demand, QC'  and foreign demand, T',  is  estimated by  the  Secretary of
Agriculture.  Acreage controls  can,  in principle,  then  be  instituted to
achieve  this  level of  production.
When  the  "correct"  acreage controls  are  imposed,  the domestic supply
function shifts  left  from S to S' in Figure  9 and  the  excess  supply function
from the United States  to  the  rest  of  the world assumes  the  shape  of ESUs.
As  can be  seen from the  diagram, world trade  is  not  affected by  the acreage
controls,  nor are  the domestic price or  domestic consumption.  However, no
stocks are  accumulated  by  the  government  and deficiency payments  are
reduced from PLPTFH  to PLPTIJ.  Other effects  of  the  scheme  are  given in
Table 4.
There  is  a fundamental difference between  this system and  those
discussed earlier in section 3;  gross revenue  to  producers  is  OPTIQ
rather  than OPTFQp, a fall  of  QpIFQp.  Of  course  if  payments  are  made for-20-
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land diverted from production then gross  revenue will be  higher  than OPTIQp
but  then the net welfare  loss  of  the program will  also be  correspondingly
higher.
Given an objective of  providing producers with a gross  revenue of
ii
OPTIQp,  it  is  relevant  to  ask whether this  might  be  achieved more efficiently
than under the current system without  exceeding deficiency payments  of
PLPTIJ and without accumulating stocks.  The answer is  in the affirmative
and the method is  evident  from a study  of Figures 9 and 5, namely,  by aban-
donning all three policies  and  returning  to a free market allocation where
gross  revenue is OPWBQp - OPTIQp, deficiency payments  are  zero and no
government stocks  are accumulated.  In  fact,  the  diagrams  have been
constructed to  produce this  result  but  the  degree of  "rigging" involved is
slight.  The  result arises  from the assumption that  the  foreign demand func-
tion is  sufficiently elastic  that  a fall  in  the world price from PW  to PW
will  bring forth enough additional export  revenue to  compensate for  (1) the
loss  of domestic revenue  (assuming domestic demand  is  inelastic) and  (2) the
loss  of  deficiency  payments.
For  those who are willing to  accept  that  foreign demand is  elastic but
not  to  the extent  discussed above, a simple deficiency payment scheme with
target price just high enough  to make  deficiency payments equal to PLPTIJ,
might be more acceptable.  The extra exports would reduce the world price
below PW, increase export  revenue and  reduce domestic revenue.  It  is  likely
that  revenue from both sources plus  the deficiency payments would exceed
OPTIQ p. It  must  be acknowledged that  it  is  possible  that  domestic demand
is so highly inelastic, foreign demand of  such moderate elasticity, and
the  relative importance of  domestic and foreign demand is  such that  the-22-
reduction in domestic revenue will outweigh  the increase  in foreign  revenue
plus  the deficiency  payments  of  PLPTIJ;  only an empirical analysis  can
settle such a dispute.  Such a study is  too  ambitious for  this  paper but we
can briefly outline what  it would involve.  Wheat and feed grains would need
to be  treated separately and  the parameters  of  (domestic) demand and supply
equations would need  to be  estimated.  On the face  of  it,  single equation
estimation methods would appear to  be  suitable in  the U.S.  case since
target prices  and  loan rates  are  set  by  administrative fiat.  Consequently,
price-quantity combinations such  as  (PT,Qp) can be  identified  as  falling on
a supply function, while  combinations  such as  (PL,QC) trace out  a demand
function.  Variables other  than own price,  for example  prices  of other
grains, should be  included as  explanatory variables in demand and  supply
equations.  An estimate  of  the  excess supply function of  the United States
could then  be  obtained by  subtracting domestic demand from domestic supply.
Similarly,  supply and demand functions  for grain in all  other countries
which import or export grain would need  to be  estimated.  Their excess
demand or supply  functions could then be  aggregated  to form  the excess
demand function  from the  rest  of  the world which confronts U.S.  exporters.
Once these  functions had  been estimated we could not  only settle  the
question regarding elasticities of  domestic and  foreign demand, we  could
also obtain numerical estimates  of  the various welfare measures listed in
Table 4.-23-
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